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A. INTRODUCTION 
Gretton and Steven comment that “[t]he concept of ‘matrimonial property’ is of limited 
importance from a property law standpoint.”1 Are the concepts of property law of equally 
limited importance when defining “matrimonial property” for the purposes of financial 
provision on divorce? The tension between the orthodoxies of property law and those of the 
financial provision regime were highlighted in Grant v Grant.2 In this case, the Sheriff 
Appeal Court held  that the date at which an asset was acquired can be the date of 
construction of  family house, rather than the date of acquisition of the land on which it 
stands, which would have been the expected answer according to property doctrine. The 
decision raises significant issues regarding the relationship between property law and the 
provisions of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985. Does the statutory context justify 
departure from the long-established doctrine that the legal status of an accessory follows that 
of the principal? If the usual rules of property law do not apply, on what basis are decisions 
about the scope of “matrimonial property” to be made? Is fairness between the parties the 
only principle that matters? 
 
B. THE FACTS IN GRANT 
Grant related to whether a house in Aberdeenshire fell to be treated as matrimonial property 
for the purposes of divorce. Section 10(4) of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 (the “1985 
Act”) provides that: 
“matrimonial property” means all the property belonging to the parties or either of 
them at the relevant date which was acquired by them or him (otherwise than by way 
of gift or succession from a third party)— (a) before the marriage for use by them as a 
family home or as furniture or plenishings for such home; or (b) during the marriage 
but before the relevant date…. 
                                                          
1 G L Gretton and A J M Steven, Property, Trusts and Succession, 3rd edn (2017), para 11.12. 
2 [2018] SAC (Civ) 4. 
The land on which the house was built was acquired by one of the spouses in 1994. This was 
before an established relationship between the parties; on the face of it, therefore, the land fell 
outside the terms of section 10(4). Between 1996 and 1997 the parties constructed a house on 
the land, which they subsequently occupied together. Two children were born in 1998 and 
2001 respectively. The parties married in 2003 but separated in 2008. 
As there was enough evidence to suggest that the house had been constructed as a 
family home, the judgment turned on whether this intention applied when the property “was 
acquired”. Did the fact that, under the general principles of property law,3 the house acceded 
to the land mean that the date of acquisition was the date at which the land was purchased? 
Or, for the purposes of the 1985 Act, could the date of acquisition be the date when the house 
was constructed? 
 
C. JUDGMENT 
In line with the established principles of accession,4 the house and land were held to form one 
single object of property.5 However, rather than the date of acquisition of this asset being the 
date at which the land was acquired, the relevant date was held to be the point at which 
construction of the house was completed.6 Sheriff Principal Turnbull rejected the suggestion 
that the applicable norms should be those of property law: “[t]he law of accession regulates 
ownership of the property in question; it does not affect whether or not that property is 
matrimonial property for the purposes of the 1985 Act.”7 In the circumstances, the evidence 
indicated that the intentions of the parties at the time of construction were that the property 
should be used a family home.8 The case was therefore remitted for proof to determine 
whether the house did, as a result, fall within the definition of matrimonial property set out in 
section 10(4) of the Act. 
 
D. ANALYSIS 
                                                          
3 Brand’s Trustees v Brand’s Trustees (1876) 3 R (HL) 16; K G C Reid, “Property: Part 1 – 
General Law”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia vol 18 (1993), para 
578. 
4 See Reid, “Property” (n3), paras 574; 578. 
5 Grant, para 13. 
6 Grant, para 14. 
7 Grant, para 14. 
8 Grant, para 15. 
Grant is likely to have significant implications where a couple construct a family home on 
land owned by one of the parties, and perhaps also in in other contexts where non-
matrimonial property is converted to domestic use. As well as the boundary between property 
and family law, the decision raises policy issues regarding the roles that should be attributed 
to intention and fairness when determining whether a family home should be brought within 
the scope of the regime governing financial provision on divorce. 
In general, marriage does not alter proprietary rights.9 It follows from this that the 
question of whether an object is matrimonial property for the purposes of the 1985 Act 
should be treated as separate from the question of ownership under the usual rules of property 
law.10 As Griffiths et al explain, whether or not an asset is matrimonial property “does not 
change ownership.”11 It might nevertheless be thought that the general principles of property 
law will determine if and how an asset has been “acquired” by the parties for the purposes of 
the financial provision regime. Under these principles, a building is an accessory to the land 
on which it is built.12 As an accessory takes on the legal attributes of the principal,13 the date 
of acquisition would be determined by the principal rather than the accessory. From the 
perspective of property law, the decision in Grant is thus difficult to reconcile with the 
fundamental principles of accession. One response would be to dismiss the issue as one of 
statutory construction that does not bear on questions of acquisition as a matter of property 
law. To the extent that this approach preserves the internal coherence of property rules, it is 
perhaps justified. However, coherence comes here at the expense of disjuncture between 
property and family law.  
The judgment reflects the important role played by fairness and equality under the 
1985 Act.14  On one hand, the question of whether an object is matrimonial property is 
distinct from the question of how its value should be shared between the parties. However, 
the very purpose of determining an object to be matrimonial property is to ensure that such 
                                                          
9 K McK Norrie, “Child and Family Law”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial 
Encyclopaedia Reissue (2004), para 652; E Clive, The Law of Husband and Wife in Scotland, 
4th edn (1997), para 14-019. 
10 Norrie, “Child and Family Law” (n 9), para 652.  
11 A Griffiths, J Fotheringham and F McCarthy, Family Law, 4th edn (2015), para 13.11. 
12 Brand’s Trustees v Brand’s Trustees (1876) 3 R (HL) 16; Reid, “Property” (n3), paras 574 
and 578.  
13 Reid, “Property” (n3), para 574. 
14 On the historical background to the current regime, see Norrie, “Child and Family Law” (n 
9), paras 644-645; Clive (n 9), ch 14. 
property is shared fairly between the parties on divorce.15 Fairness is therefore inevitably an 
important consideration when deciding whether an object falls within the scope of 
matrimonial property. In Grant, Sheriff Principal Turnbull comments that the concept of 
matrimonial property “exists to give effect to those parts of the Act which deal with financial 
provision.”16 In some ways then, the question of whether an asset is matrimonial property is 
secondary to the question of what is just in the context of the parties’ overall relationship.17 It 
is consistent with the need to ensure fairness that the family home, likely to be the parties’ 
principal asset, should be brought within the scope of financial provision calculations. 
In this respect the decision is indicative of the special status afforded to family homes, 
which are “closely associated with the parties’ joint family life”.18 Money which is not 
matrimonial property (for example an inheritance) will become matrimonial property if used 
to purchase a family home, whether or not the purchase is prior to marriage.19 Indeed, the use 
of the property as a family home may justify equal sharing of its value between the parties 
despite the source of the funds used to acquire it.20 As Lord MacFadyen put it in Cunningham 
v Cunningham,21 such funds are “devoted in a particularly clear way to matrimonial purposes, 
and the source of the funds so used is in my view less important than it would be in the case 
of other types of matrimonial property.”22  
Clarity and certainty are also important elements of fairness, however, and the 
decision in Grant does raise questions as to exactly how the date of acquisition should be 
determined. The 1985 Act does not define the term “acquired”, but it would be natural to 
assume that it might refer to acquisition of rights to the asset under the rules of property law. 
If property rules do not govern the dates at which matrimonial assets are acquired or 
transferred, what is the source of the alternative regime? The date of acquisition suggested by 
the Sheriff Principal is the date “when the house was completed”.23 It seems likely that this 
might sometimes be complex to assess, particularly in the context of ongoing work and 
                                                          
15 Ibid, and see section 9(1)(a) of the 1985 Act. 
16 Grant, para 9. 
17 See, for example, Willson v Willson [2008] CSOH 161, at para 50 per Lord Drummond 
Young. 
18 Clive (n 9), para 24-025. 
19 See Norrie, “Child and Family Law” (n 9), para 658. 
20 The source of the funds or assets used to acquire matrimonial property is one of the 
justifications for departure from the principle of equal sharing under s 10(6)(b) of the 1985 
Act. 
21 2001 Fam LR 12. 
22 Cunningham (n 21) at para 25. 
23 Grant, para 14. 
improvements or changes in intention. This may create difficulties for practitioners when 
advising clients who wish to protect assets from the matrimonial property regime.24  
Grant also raises broader policy questions regarding the situation where any non-
matrimonial dwelling is converted to use as a family home. Cases such as Maclellan v 
Maclellan,25 in which a croft that had not been acquired for use as a matrimonial home was 
held not to be matrimonial property, suggest that a change of intention in itself is not enough 
to bring a home within the scope of the statute. This view is supported by Professor Meston, 
who suggests that intention at the time of the acquisition is the crucial factor, whether or not 
these intentions change.26 There is, however, a contrasting, if possibly erroneous, line of 
reasoning evident in cases such as Buczynska.27 Griffiths and others have pointed to the 
hardship that may be caused by failing to take account of changed intentions;28 in this respect 
the decision in Grant can be seen as favouring a more flexible approach. 
An alternative strategy, which might have avoided some of the doctrinal 
contradictions raised above, would have been to rely on the special rules in sections 9(1)(b) to 
9(1)(e) of the 1985 Act to ensure fairness between the parties. Even where a family home 
falls outwith the definition of “matrimonial property”, and hence does not require to be 
shared fairly under section 9(1)(a), it would still be open to the court to make an order in 
respect of the property under sections 9(1)(b) to (e) of the Act. These subsections allow the 
court to, respectively, reflect any economic advantage or disadvantage; share the economic 
burden of caring for children; enable one party to adjust to the loss of the other’s financial 
support and alleviate any serious financial hardship resulting from the divorce.29 Critically, 
the court must consider the overall financial position of the parties, taking into account assets 
which are not matrimonial property.30 Thus, where one party had contributed financially to 
                                                          
24 On this point see A Maitles, “Family briefing: how do the matrimonial property rules apply 
to a family home built on land acquired by one party before the relationship began?” (2018) 
63(5) Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 28.  
25 See also Ranaldi v Ranaldi 1994 SLT (Sh Ct) 25 
26 M C Meston, “Matrimonial Property and the Family Home” 1993 SLT (News) 62, at 62-
63. 
27 Buczynska v Buczynski 1989 SLT 558. For criticism, see Clive (n 9), para 24-025 at fn 70; 
Griffiths et al. (n 11), para 13-16. 
28 Griffiths et al. (n 11) para 13-16. As Thomson points out, the present rules may neglect the 
significance of long periods of cohabitation before marriage: J Thomson, Family Law in 
Scotland, 7th edn (2014), 159. 
29 On the relationship between these principles, see Norrie, “Child and Family Law” (n 9), 
paras 651. 
30 As Norrie comments, this provision may be particularly helpful where there are substantial 
assets but no “matrimonial property”: Norrie, “Child and Family Law” (n 9), para 664. 
the construction of a house on land owned by the other, an award under s9(1)(b) could 
address any economic disadvantage by redistributing the value of the property, 
notwithstanding that it was not “matrimonial property”. Any claims made under sections 
9(1)(c) to 9(1)(e) could also be met from the value of an asset which was not matrimonial 
property. It is not, therefore, necessary to adjust the rules of accession in order to achieve 
fairness in financial provision. 
 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
It is, in many ways, surprising that reference to an asset being “acquired” in matrimonial 
property legislation, and, by implication, other statutory contexts, does not necessarily relate 
to the asset being acquired for the purposes of property law. It may be easy for property 
lawyers to dismiss Grant as relevant only to the specific statutory regime surrounding the 
1985 Act. However, broader questions remain regarding the relationship between property 
and family law. Is there now a separate body of rules regulating acquisition and transfer for 
the purposes of family law? In terms of accession, can an accessory, in some contexts, 
determine the date when the principal is acquired? If this is only true for the purposes of the 
1985 Act, at what point does the exception start to erode the rule?  
From the point of view of family law, the decision in Grant affirms the importance of 
flexibility and attentiveness to individual circumstances. It highlights the likelihood that the 
1985 Act will be interpreted in a purposive manner to bring assets within the scope of the 
financial provision regime, especially where there is an intention to create a family home. It 
also reopens a debate regarding the treatment of pre-matrimonial assets on divorce, 
particularly where there have been long periods of cohabitation prior to marriage. There is a 
strong argument that a family home should always be treated as “matrimonial property”, 
leaving cases where it would be unfair for its value to be equally divided to be covered by the 
special rules in sections 9(1)(b) to 9(1)(e) of the 1985 Act. This would, however, require 
amendment to the statute. The issue might usefully be considered by the Scottish Law 
Commission as part of its upcoming review of family law.31 Failing such reform, however, it 
would be preferable for the courts to address unfairness in financial provision using their 
powers in sections 9(1)(b) to 9(1)(e), leaving fundamental property principles intact. In the 
                                                          
31 Scottish Law Commission, Tenth Programme of Law Reform (Scot Law Com No 250, 
2018).  
meantime, Grant prioritises justice in the circumstances, with all the ambiguity and potential 
inconsistency that such an approach implies.  
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